The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Theistic Explanation

Abstract

The problem of evil remains one of the most enduring and challenging objections to classical theism. It questions how belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God can be reconciled with the pervasive reality of moral and natural evil. This paper critically examines the logical and evidential formulations of the problem of evil, engaging with key philosophical arguments developed by thinkers such as J. L. Mackie and William L. Rowe. It explores traditional theistic responses, including the free will defense articulated by Alvin Plantinga and soul-making theodicies inspired by John Hick, assessing their explanatory scope and limitations. The study argues that while these responses may mitigate certain versions of the logical problem, they struggle to provide a fully satisfactory account of apparently gratuitous suffering and large-scale natural disasters. Furthermore, the paper highlights the epistemic limits of human reasoning when attempting to justify divine purposes, raising concerns about whether appeals to mystery undermine meaningful theological explanation. Rather than offering a definitive resolution, the analysis suggests that the problem of evil exposes structural tensions within theistic frameworks and calls for a more modest understanding of what religious explanation can achieve. The paper concludes that the debate ultimately reflects deeper questions about moral intuition, epistemic humility, and the boundaries of rational theology.